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J. EGYPT: EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK STRONGLY SUGGESTED

TO AN INTERVIEWER IN SUDAN LAST WEEK THAT SYRIA CANNOT NECESSARILY

COUNT ON EGYPTIAN SUPPORT IF IT INITIATES AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL.

MUBARAK APPARENTLY WAS TRYING TO DISSUADE THE SYRIANS FROM

INCREASING MILITARY TENSIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BEFORE THE

UN MANDATE EXPIRES ON SUNDAY.4

THIS IS THE MOST DIRECT SUGGESTION BY AN EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL

THAT CAIRO MIGHT STAND ASIDE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. PRESIDENT

SADAT AND OTHER EGYPTIANS HAVE ALWAYS SKIRTED THE ISSUE IN THE PAST,

AFFIRMING THEIR BELIEF THAT SYRIA IN ANY CASE WOULD NOT START

AN ATTACK.4

MUBARAK LAST WEEK TOLD A SUDAN NEUS AGENCY REPORTER IN KHARTOUM THAT NO STATE COULD START A WAR AND EXPECT AUTOMATIC SUPPORT FROM A FRIENDLY STATE, "BECAUSE THE SISTER OR FRIENDLY STATE MAY NOT BE READY TO ENTER THE WAR." HE AFFIRMED THAT EGYPT SUPPORTS SYRIA BUT SAID COORDINATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE INITIATING WARFARE."

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ALL MAJOR EGY	HAR NAITH	ERS. HIS	REMAR	KZ MII	LL REINFOR	CE THE	
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BORDER INTO I	NDIA-//Y		-				
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HAVE BEEN HAR	AZZED AND	THAT TH	E HIND	n coul	MUNITY THE	RE IS U	NEASY.
AT THE SAME T	IME, HE S	TATED TH	AT THE	CASES	S OF HARAS	THAME	
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REACHED THE P	ROPORTION	OF AN E	. SUGOX	" IND	IVN Zbokez	MEN HAVI	Ε
FREQUENTLY WA	RNED THAT	A FLIGH	T OF H	INDU 6	REFUGEES T	O INDIA-	
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NUMBER ABOUT 10 MILLION, HAVE STARTED TO MOVE INTO INDIA, THEY ARE CERTAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNSTABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BANGLADESH, AND SOME MAY BE LEAVING THE COUNTRY.//Y

//A FEW HINDUS REPORTEDLY WERE HARASSED IN DACCA SHORTLY

AFTER A WAVE OF MUTINIES BEGAN IN THE ARMED FORCES OVER TWO WEEKS

AGO. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH REPORTS SINCE THEN, HOWEVER,

AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SLOWLY REASSERTING ITS CONTROL OVER

REBELLIOUS MILITARY UNITS DURING THE PAST WEEK.//Y

//THE CENSORED INDIAN PRESS, MEANWHILE, HAS RECENTLY TAKEN ON A MORE EMOTIONAL AND PESSIMISTIC TONE IN ITS COVERAGE OF THE EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. THE PRESS HAS EMPHASIZED BOTH THE CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN BANGLADESH AND NEW DELHI'S CONCERN FOR ITS OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND OTHER INDIAN NATIONALS THERE. IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, TWO CALCUTTA NEWSPAPERS HAVE BLAMED THE DACCA GOVERNMENT FOR WHAT THEY HAVE LABELED AN "ANTI-INDIAN CAMPAIGN."//Y

//NEW DELHI MAY BE REACTING TO RECENT IMPLIED CRITICISH OF
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT BY BANGLADESH'S DEPUTY MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATORS, GENERAL ZIA AND COMMODORE KHAN. IN CALLS FOR UNITY
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EAST ASIA BRIEF 182-75.4

D. CHINA: LIKE OTHER SECTORS OF CHINESE SOCIETY, THE

PLA IS PREPARING TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE NEW CAMPAIGN

TO BUILD TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES AND MECHANIZE AGRICUL
TURE. THE ARMY HAS LONG BEEN INVOLVED IN RURAL AS

WELL AS URBAN PRODUCTION TASKS, AND ITS PARTICIPA
TION IN THIS LATEST CAMPAIGN IS NOT SURPRISING. IN

KEEPING WITH THE HIGH PRIORITY ATTACHED TO TACHAI,

THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (GPD) TOOK THE UN
USUAL STEP OF ISSUING A CIRCULAR THAT LAYS OUT THE

BROAD GUIDELINES FOR THE ARMY'S PARTICIPATION. IN

RESPONSE, A NUMBER OF MILITARY DISTRICTS HAVE ISSUED

CIRCULARS OF THEIR OWN AND CONVENED MEETINGS IN ORDER

TO LAUNCH THE MILITARY INTO THE CAMPAIGN.Y

THE GPD CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT A LARGE PORTION,
PERHAPS THE MAJORITY, OF TACHAI-RELATED ACTIVITIES
WILL FALL ON ARMY MEN WHO HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO
OR DEMOBILIZED IN THE RURAL AREAS. ACCORDING TO
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THE CIRCULAR, THESE CADRES AND FIGHTERS ARE TO WORK IN THE "FOREFRONT" OF BUILDING TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES. SOME PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS HAVE ECHOED THIS THEME. AND THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT THE MILITIA IS ALSO BEING ASKED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE. THE CHEKIANG MILITARY DISTRICT, FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY HELD A PROVINCE-WIDE CONFERENCE ON MILITIA WORK. THE MEET-ING, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED BY MD COMMANDER CHANG WEN-PI, WAS DESIGNED TO FIRE UP THE MILITIA FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TACHAI MOVEMENT. MILITARY CADRES ARE ALSO GOING DOWN TO THE VILLAGES TO TAKE CHARGE OF ORGANIZ-ING THE MILITIA'S ACTIVITIES, AND TACHAI MAY WELL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS TO RESPOND TO PEKING'S CALL FOR A TRIM-MER COMMAND STRUCTURE WHILE FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGA-TION TO THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN.Y

REGULAR PLA UNITS ARE ALSO BEING PRESSED INTO SERVICE, BUT THE EXTENT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IS

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FAR FROM CLEAR. AT A MINIMUM, ARMY UNITS ARE EXPECTED TO DEVOTE A GOOD DEAL OF STUDY TIME TO THE
"TACHAI SPIRIT" WHICH STRESSES SELF-RELIANCE AND A
DISCIPLINED WORK STYLE. SOLDIERS ARE ALSO BEING ENCOURAGED TO PERSUADE COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE RECENTLY
BEEN DEMOBILIZED, YOUNG RELATIVES, AND FAMILY MEMBERS
TO SETTLE IN THE RURAL AREAS RATHER THAN THE CITY.

REGULAR PLA UNITS ARE ALSO BEING USED DIRECTLY
IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. EVIDENCE OF PLA PARTICIPATION
IN TACHAI-STYLE PROJECTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING
HAS BEEN OBSERVED RECENTLY. THE EXTENT TO
WHICH REGULAR FIGHTING UNITS WILL BE CALLED UPON TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE TACHAI MOVEMENT, HOWEVER, IS UNCLEAR.
THE CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT THE EXTENT OF THE PLA'S
PARTICIPATION WAS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
FOR THOSE IN PEKING WHO PLANNED THE TACHAI MOVEMENT.
THECIRCULAR REVEALS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONCERN THAT
THE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TRAINING AND WAR
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PREPAREDNESS MIGHT TEMPT COMMANDERS OPPOSED TO DI
VERTING THEIR RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN ENDS TO IGNORE

THE TACHAI CAMPAIGN. IN DISCUSSING THE SIGNIFICANCE

OF THE CAMPAIGN. THE CIRCULAR SPECIFICALLY WARNS

AGAINST IGNORING OR OBSTRUCTING THE CAMPAIGN. AT AN
OTHER POINT IT UNDERSCORES THIS MESSAGE BY JUXTAPOSING

MODERNIZATION OF THE PLA WITH THE TACHAI MOVEMENT:

"...WHILE RESOLUTELY IMPLEMENTING THE SERIES OF DI
RECTIVES OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION. LAUNCH ACTIVITIES

TO LEARN FROM TACHAI IN A WIDESPREAD AND THOROUGH

MANNER. "Y

WHILE PEKING UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS SOME ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY PLA REGULAR UNITS, THE CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT

UNITS OUGHT NOT BE PRESSED INTO TACHAI ACTIVITIES

WITHOUT A CAREFUL AND CASE-BY-CASE CONSIDERATION OF

HOW THIS WILL AFFECT MILITARY READINESS. IN DISCUS
SING THE BUILDING OF TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES, THE CIR
CULAR SPECIFIED THAT THE PLA WILL BE EXPECTED TO HELP

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WITH MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ONLY "IF CONDITIONS PERMIT." APPARENTLY, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE NEEDS OF THE TACHAI PROJECT IN A GIVEN LOCALE AND THE MILITARY READINESS OR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THOSE ARMY UNITS IN THE AREA. THUS FAR THE PROVINCIAL TREATMENT OF THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN MIXED. SOME PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS FAIL TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF ALLOCATING MILITARY RESOURCES FOR TACHAI PROJECTS WHILE A COUPLE OF OTHERS HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN THE GPD CIRCULAR IN INDICATING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RELEASE MEN AND MATERIAL ON BEHALF OF TACHAI. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.+

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OCTOBER AND THE PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS IN MID-NOVEMBER.4

THE ISSUES CAUSING THE BREAKDOUNS HAVE VARIED FROM ONE FORUM TO THE NEXT, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM LIES IN MOSCOW'S SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION OF ITS LEAD-ERSHIP WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC. TO ACHIEVE THIS RECOGNITION MOSCOW, THROUGH ITS EAST GERMAN ALLY, HAS SUBMITTED AT LEAST FOUR SEPARATE DRAFT DECLARATIONS TO THE COM-MITTEES PREPARING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. EACH VERSION HAS BEEN BLANDER THAN THE ONE PRECEDING. BUT THE RESPONSE FROM INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTIES IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN GENERALLY NEGA-TIVE. MOSCOW PERSISTS BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT EVEN WITH A TOOTHLESS CONCLUDING DOCUMENT--OR NONE AT ALL -- THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE IS IN ITSELF SUFFICIENT TOGIVE SYMBOLIC RECOGNITION TO MOSCOU'S IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP. Y

THE CEMA SUMMIT HAS BEEN RUMORED SINCE EARLY SUM-DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:

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MER AND COULD WELL BE A MAJOR EVENT. THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY TWO SUCH SUMMITS, AND THE LAST GATHERING IN 1969 APPARENTLY TOOK DECISIONS LEADING TO THE WRITING OF CEMA'S LONG-TERM COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM. THIS YEAR'S SUMMIT WOULD REPORTEDLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH "RAU MATERIALS, MACHINE BUILDING, AGRICULTURE, AND TEAMS-PORT," WHICH COULD COVER SUCH SENSITIVE TOPLC SHARPLY HIGHER PRICES MOSCOW SUDDENLY IMPOSED ON ITS RAW MATERIALS EARLY THIS YEAR AND THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET GRAIN SHORTFALL. THE SUMMIT IS ALSO EXPECTED TO DISCUSS GUIDELINES FOR FORMALIZING RELATIONS BE-TWEEN CEMA AND THE EC. EVEN WITH THE STATIC CREATED BY THE ROMANIANS, UHO OPPOSE THE IMPOSITION OF CEMA CONTROL OVER BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE COMMON MAR-KET, THESE QUESTIONS ARE NOT THE SORT THAT ARE US-UALLY HANDLED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. A HINT OF A MAJOR CONCERN OF THE SUMMIT WAS GIVEN BY A SOVIET CEMA SPECIALIST, WHO SAID THAT "SOME ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

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IN CEMA ORGANIZATION MAY BE MADE, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CEMA SECRETARIAT." THIS MAY MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FORMS THAT WILL EXPEDITE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE BLOC.Y

ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING FOR MORE INTEGRATION IS THE ACTIVITY OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE MILITARY COUNCIL REPORTEDLY CONTENDED WITH THE "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES" CALLED FOR BY THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND ROMANIA'S CONTINUING REFUSAL TO ALLOW LARGE NUMBERS OF ITS TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN PACT EXERCISES. IT ALSO WRESTLED WITH THE PACT'S 1976 EXERCISE SCHEDULE. THE DEFENSE MINISTERS APPARENTLY CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC AND WENT ON TO DISCUSS "THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES" IN MOSCOW AND "THE CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GUIDING BODIES OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES."

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PLY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO EXPAND THE NETWORK OF COORDINATING BODIES WITHIN THE WARSAU PACT. SO, A LARGE PART OF THE AGENDA OF THE RUMORED PACT SUMMIT COULD BE DEVOTED TO WAYS TO ENHANCE PACT IN-TEGRATION. THERE MAY BE A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FOR NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS PACT AND CEMA SUMMITS. THOUGH PRECEDENTS ARE SOMETIMES FALSE FRIENDS, THE LAST EXPANSION OF THE WARSAW PACT WEB OF ORGANIZATIONS TOOK PLACE IN 1969, WHEN THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND DE-FENSE MINISTERS' COMMITTEE WERE CREATED. THIS WAS THE SAME YEAR THAT CEMA DECIDED ON ITS "COMPLEX PRO-GRAM" OF INTEGRATION. 4

EAST GERMANY IS WITHOUT QUESTION THIS SEASON'S MODEL STUDENT IN THE LESSONS OF INTEGRATION. TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF HIGH-DECIBEL PUBLICITY, VIRTUALLY . THE ENTIRE EAST GERMAN PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP TREKKED TO MOSCOW IN EARLY OCTOBER AND SIGNED A NEW-25-YEAR FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS.

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O TIP PILES

TREATY INCORPORATED THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, ASSURING THE EAST GERMANS OF SOVIET FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE IF THEIR REGIME IS IN INTERNAL, AS WELL AS EXTERNAL, DANGER; EXTENDED THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL MILITARY AID BEYOND THE CONFINES OF EURSPLA AND OBLITERATED ALL REFERENCES TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THE TREATY WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ACROSS-THE-BOARD COORDINA-TION AND COOPERATION, AND EXPANDED, THOUGH IMPRECISELY, THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN THE WARSAW PACT AND CEMA TO INCLUDE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COORDINATION.Y

THE TREATY RATTLED THE YUGOSLAVS AND POLES. AL-MOST IMMEDIATELY THEY INTERPRETED THE TREATY AS A MODEL FOR THE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES, AND THEIR RESPONSE SHOWED THAT THEY WERE HIGHLY DISPLEASED WITH THE POSSIBILITY. THE YUGOSLAVS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE DISTRESSED BY THE SHARP REMINDER THAT THE BREZHNEY DOCTRINE WAS ALIVE AND WELL, WHATEVER THE IMPRESSION

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A STRIKING NEW DEVELOPMENT DURING THE PERIOD WAS THE SPATE OF RUMORS ALLEGING SOVIET UNHAPPINESS WITH THE QUALITY OF FOLISH PARTY CHIEF GIEREK'S LEADERSHIP, THE DIRECTION OF POLISH ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE FLOURISHING TIES BETWEEN POLAND AND THE WEST. ON THE SURFACE, SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS SEEM NORMAL, AND IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT SOVIET PARTY CHIEF BREZHNEV UILL ATTEND THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS UHICH BEHIND THE SCENES, HOWEVER, OPENS ON DECEMBER 8. THERE ARE MUTTERINGS FROM POLAND ABOUT SOVIET PRE-TENSIONS IN CEMA; SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE RE-LIABILITY OF POLAND'S MILITARY; SPECULATION IN WARSAU THAT MOSCOU MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN THE SPATE OF FIRES IN OCTOBER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT GIEREK; RUMORS OF A HASTY TRIP BY SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNY TO IN-TERFERE IN THE PRE-CONGRESS JOCKEYING BETHEEN GIEREK AND PREMIER JAROSZEUICZ; AND UNSUBSTANTIATED, LOU-LEVEL REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOP MOVEHENTS IN CZECHO-

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SLOVAKIA AND THE USSR DIRECTED TOWARD PUTTING DOWN
DISORDERS IN POLAND SHOULD A REPETITION OF THE 1970
RIOTS OCCUR.Y

THE SOVIETS MAY INDEED BY UNEASY ABOUT THE FLARE-UP OF UNREST CAUSED BY THE SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS AND RUMORS OF PRICE INCREASES, BUT RATHER THAN EX-ACERBATING THE SITUATION TO UNDERMINE GIEREK, MOSCOU HAS EXTENDED SEVERAL LOANS TO EASE POLAND THROUGH ITS DIFFICULTIES. AS THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHES, NOSCOU MAY BE HEDGING ITS BETS BY MAKING SYMPATHETIC NOISES TO JAROSZEWICZ, BUT PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THE SOVIETS THAT CONTROL OF POLAND CAN BE BETTER EX-ERCISED THROUGH A LEADER WITH SOME CLAIM TO NATIONAL POPULARITY THAN THROUGH A MAN MANY POLES CONSIDER TO BE SITTING IN MOSCOU'S POCKET NEVERTHELESS, THE CHARGE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIETS THAT POLAND IS ADOPTING A "NEO-ROMANIAN" COURSE MAY HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE. LIKE THE ROMANIANS, THE POLES HAVE

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ENERGY AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES OF THEIR OWN, AN SO THEY HAVE NOT BEEN HIT AS HARD BY MOSCOW'S HIKE IN PRICES. HAVING LESS NEED TO BEG FOR ECONOMIC FAVORS FROM MOSCOW, THE POLES ARE PURSUING A SOME—WHAT MORE NATIONALIST COURSE IN THEIR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE CONFIDENCE GAINED FROM THIS EXERCISE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO WARSAW'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE EAST GERMAN EXAMPLE IN UPDATING ITS FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH MOSCOW.Y

AS USUAL, THE BAD BOYS OF THE BALKANS—BUCHAREST
AND BELGRADE—CAUSED SOME HEARTBURN IN MOSCOW. THE
ROMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS HAVE CARRIED ON AN OSTENTA—
TIOUS FLIRTATION WITH THE CHINESE DURING THE PERIOD,
BUT THE SOVIET REACTION WAS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION,
RESTRAINED. THE LIMIT WAS REACHED DURING THE VISIT
OF YUGOSLAV PREMIER BIJEDIC TO PEKING. FOLLOWING A
SPATE OF UNEXCEPTIONALLY INSULTING AFTER—DINNER RE—
MARKS FROM THE CHINESE, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

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STALKED OUT, FOLLOWED BY THE BULGARIAN, CZECHOSŁOVAK,

EAST GERMAN, MONGOLIAN, HUNGARIAN, AND POLISH REPRE
SENTATIVES. THE ROMANIANS STAYED PUT, ALONGSIDE THE

ALBANIANS, CUBANS, NORTH KOREANS, AND VIETNAMESE.

BY WALKING OUT, THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY WERE SEEKING

TO SHOW THE BALKAN DUO THE LIMITS OF THEIR TOLERANCE

FOR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PEKING.Y

SOVIET DISPLEASURE OVER ROMANIAN SNIPING AT

SOVIET POSITIONS—BOTH INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE STREAM

OF VISITORS TO PEKING AND THE NUMEROUS ROMANIAN

SPEECHES AND ARTICLES PHRASED IN AESOPIAN LANGUAGE

AND DIRECTLY IN MULTILATERAL PARTY, CEMA, AND WARSAU

PACT FORUMS—WAS UNDOUBTEDLY EXPRESSED DURING SO—

VIET PARTY SECRETARY KATUSHEV'S VISIT TO BUCHAREST

IN EARLY OCTOBER. CEAUSESCU AND TITO MAY HAVE DE—

CIDED TO POSTPONE THE GET—TOGETHER THEY HAD PLANNED

FOR MID—OCTOBER WHILE THE BEAR WAS AROUSED. THE RO—

MANIANS SENT PARTY SECRETARY ANDREI TO MOSCOW TO EX—

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MET A COLD RECEPTION. AFTER A SUITABLE INTERVAL.

THE ROMANIANS RESUMED THEIR WAR OF WORDS. THOUGH AT
A SOMEWHAT REDUCED LEVEL. AND MOSCOW HAS LAPSED INTO

STONY STLENCE.

BELGRADE'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED BY ITS INTENSIFYING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
"COMINFORMISTS," AMONG WHOSE SINS IS A GREATER LOVE
FOR MOSCOW THAN THE CURRENT YUGOSLAV PARTY LINE ALLOWS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT CHOSEN TO GET CAUGHT IN
THIS MORASS AND HAVE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT, THOUGH PRIVATELY THEY ADMIT RELATIONS ARE
STRAINED. THE CHILL IN SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS IS
REVEALED BY A COMPARISON OF PODGORNY'S REMARKS IN
MID-OCTOBER TO THE OUTGOING YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR
WITH THOSE MADE A MONTH LATER TO HIS SUCCESSOR.
PODGORNY HAD EARLIER SAID THAT MOSCOW "FIRMLY INTENDS" TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS IN

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CITY ON NOVEMBER 27. THE DIRECTION THE DISPUTE OVER BELIZE

TAKES NOW DEPENDS ON WHAT FACE-SAVING MEASURES THE BRITISH

OFFER. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT LAUGERUD

TO ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL THAT DOES NOT HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT

OF GUATEMALA'S GAINING SOME TERRITORY FROM BELIZE. {CONFIDENTIAL NOFORM} // E-2 IMPDET.H

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